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Literally ‚Islamic Jurisprudence.‛ It centers on correct observance of rituals, morals, 
and legislation within Islam. This is the process of interpreting the Qur’an, Hadith, 
precedent and using ijtihad to apply Shari’a concepts to specific cases. There are four 
main schools of fiqh within Sunni Islam, called the madh’hab, among which are the 
Hanafi (centered in Turkey and the Levant), Shafi’i (centered in the gulf and Egypt), 
Hanbali (centered in Saudi Arabia) and Maliki (centered in North Africa). Morocco is a 
country that follows Maliki fiqh. Those who are knowledgeable about historical fiqh are 
known as fuqah. 
Shari’a 
The sacred Islamic law, set forth within the Qur’an and Sunnah. Not punitive nor a set 
of given codes: instead, these texts provide the basis for a moral path that Muslims 
should follow.  Often confused for fiqh, which is the actual interpretation of these 
sources and the application of Shari’a in legal situations.   
Qur’an 
The religious text of Islam. It is the actual word of God, revealed through the Prophet 
Muhammad.  
 Hadith 
Collections of actions and sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammed. These are 
narratives about the Prophet passed on through word of mouth and recorded, then 
verified according to the chain of narration (isnad). Depending on the isnad, the hadith is 
either considered to be sound or weak.  
Sunnah 




Technical term which refers to making a legal decision by independent interpretation of 
legal sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Recent reforms have called for an increase in 
mujtahids, who are those independent citizens who reject the authority of the ‘ulama and 
interpret the texts for themselves.  
‘Ulama 
The plural Arabic term of Muslim legal scholar, trained in one form of fiqh. Usually 
considered to represent the consensus (ijma) of the Ummah. Traditionally those who 
practice ijtihad.   
Ummah 
Community of Muslims  
Amir al-Mu’minin 
Literally ‚Commander of the Faithful‛ is the title of the King of Morocco.  
Bey’a 
















‚How can we hope to achieve progress and prosperity while women, who constitute half of 
society, see that their interests are ignored, regardless of those rights that our holy religion has 
given them…even though they…[can] compete with men… in science or employment [?]‛1 
 -King Mohammed VI of Morocco, the day of his ascension to the throne 
 
The date is 1999, and the new King Mohammed VI has ascended to Morocco’s 
throne. In addition to taking on the illustrious title of King of the modern state of 
Morocco, he also takes on the title of ‚Commander of the Faithful,‛ a historical title that 
connects the legitimacy of his role to the religious actions that he undertakes. His first 
speech focuses on his project as the new King, which consists of the continuation of a 
dynasty while bringing Morocco into accordance with international human rights law. 
He questions how Morocco can move forward without equal rights for women and 
therefore for all people. Regarded as the ‚King of the Poor,‛ he focuses on how he can 
improve the conditions of Moroccans throughout the country through the integration of 
                                                          
1 « Comment espérer atteindre le progrès et la prospérité alors que les femmes, qui constituent la moitié de la société, 
voient leurs intérêts bafoués, sans tenir compte des droits par lesquels notre sainte religion les a mises sur un pied 
d'égalité avec les hommes, des droits qui correspondent à leur noble mission, leur rendant justice contre toute 
iniquité ou violence dont elles pourraient être victimes, alors même qu'elles ont atteint un niveau qui leur permet de 
rivaliser avec les hommes, que ce soit dans le domaine de la science ou de l'emploi? » King Mohammed VI 
‚Discours du 46ème Anniversaire de la Révolution du Roi et du Peuple,‛ 20 August 1999. 
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women into Moroccan society.2 The combination of tradition and modernization is 
encapsulated within the Mudawwana, or the Moroccan family code.  
On the surface, the Mudawwana is a simple legal document of 132 pages 
consisting of 7 sections which detail the law applicable to Muslim Moroccans3 
pertaining to family and to personal status; that is, marriage, divorce, nationality, 
custody and inheritance. Although it is but one part of Morocco’s body of laws, it has 
long been held up as the ignominious proof of Morocco’s lack of opportunity for 
women.4 Not only do its critics use this document to criticize Morocco’s status as a 
modern state, but this document has also traditionally precluded Morocco’s adherence 
to international human rights conventions.  
Codified in 1957 by the first independent King of Morocco, Mohammed V, the 
Mudawwana functioned as a ‚declaration of independence‛5 from the French colonizer’s 
values and morals. Determined by the elite ‘ulama,6 the Mudawwana was created as a 
continuation of traditional Maliki fiqh.7 This codification was the result of a post-colonial 
                                                          
2 Buskens, Léon. ‚Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Politics in an 
Emerging Public Sphere.‛ Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 1 (2003): 94 
3 Jewish Moroccans have their own family code called the Hebraic Moroccan Family Law. 
4 See: Alison Baker. Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women. New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1998 among others. 
5 Nadia Guessous, in conversation, January 19. 
6 Islamic legal scholars who are the historical arbiters of Shari’a. See Glossary, page 4. 
7 Fiqh literally means ‚Islamic Jurisprudence.‛ It centers on correct observance of rituals, morals, and 
legislation within Islam. Morocco is a country that follows the Maliki school. Hence, historically Morocco 
is a country whose laws followed Maliki fiqh.  
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scholarly investigation taking place in many Muslim countries about the nature of fiqh 
and Shari’a and the ways in which Shari’a should be codified, if indeed it was possible.  
Historically, Shari’a is more of a way of life than ‚Islamic Law‛ in the sense of 
punitive western legal codes. Shari’a ‚represented a complex set of social, economic, 
moral and cultural relations that permeated the epistemic structures of the social and 
political orders.‛8 In short, Shari’a is the spiritual path for how to live one’s life correctly 
as a Muslim. On the other hand, the actual practical application of this message is 
encapsulated in fiqh. Fiqh roughly refers to Islamic Jurisprudence, which is how most 
people (incorrectly) translate Shari’a. Fiqh is the result of a series of steps of analysis and 
interpretation of foundational sources and contextual details that determines the correct 
way to apply the spirit of Shari’a in specific situations. In addition to juridicical 
reasoning and analysis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah9 (ijtihad), fiqh is derived from 
consensus (ijma) and reasoning by analysis (qiyas).10 There are four main schools of 
Sunni fiqh, including the Maliki School practiced in Morocco. Although many scholars11 
argue that the ‚gates of ijtihad‛ were closed in the 10th century, this was challenged by 
the post-colonial debate about Shari’a. In Morocco, the ‘ulama (Muslim scholars) 
                                                          
8 Hallaq, Wael B. Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 
543 
9 Recorded collection of the sayings (hadith) and living habits of the Prophet Muhammad.  
10 An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed. Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008: xviii 
11 Most notably Joseph Schacht in Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford, 1964. 
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concluded the codifying fiqh was possible, and this was expressed in the creation of the 
1957 Mudawwana. 
The term ‚Mudawwana,‛ literally meaning ‚register‛ or ‚written document,‛ 
refers to the title of ‚one of the most authoritative compendia *of opinions+<of the 
[Maliki] school [of fiqh].‛ This compendium of opinions actually has nothing to do with 
the family, but instead harkens back in time to suggest that this Code is in fact the 
natural heir to the entire Maliki fiqh tradition. This is the only Moroccan law code to be 
‚based systematically on Islamic law.‛12 The full name of the Mudawwana is ‚al-
Mudawwana al-ahwal al-Shakhsiyya,‛ literally a translation from the French ‚statut 
personnel,‛ or ‚Code of Personal Status.‛ With the codification of the Mudawwana came 
the beginning of a protest by female members of Morocco, beginning in 1957 and 
continuing up to the present.  
As one of the few Muslim countries to both sign and attempt to ratify CEDAW 
(the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women), 
Morocco inhabits a unique position in the Muslim world.13 Morocco signed CEDAW 
                                                          
12 Gray, Doris H. Muslim Women on the Move: Moroccan Women and French Women of Moroccan Origin Speak 
Out. Maryland: Lexington Books, 2008: xvii-xvii 
13 This Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 for the 1980 Copenhagen World 
Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace. It is an effort to 
‚codify comprehensively international legal standards for women.‛  
Countries are allowed to sign CEDAW and submit reservations to specific articles ‚provided that 
these reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.‛ CEDAW lists 
official ‚impermissible reservations‛ which include reservations to Articles 2 and 16.  These Articles are 
the most ‚core‛ provisions of CEDAW so a reservation to Article 2 or 16 is a reservation to the entire 
Convention. CEDAW argues that neither ‚traditional, religious or cultural practice‛ justifies a reservation 
to these Articles. The Committee offers option of removing these reservations, however to this day ‚few 
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under Hassan II in June 1993, but never published it in al-Jarida ar-Rasmiyya, which is 
the official law magazine in the country. In addition, Morocco retained a series of 
reservations to the Convention, unable to fully ratify it.14 Each of these reservations has 
its base in the Mudawwana and its tenets concerning the equality of men and women in 
legislation governing marriage, divorce, nationality and custody.  
All Muslim countries save for Afghanistan and Yemen have formally expressed 
reservations to CEDAW, all sharing the ‚impermissible‛ reservation to Article 16. 
Article 16 of CEDAW stipulates that States Parties must take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations, including providing both men and women the ‚same right to freely 
choose a spouse and to enter into marriage, the sharing of rights and responsibilities 
during the marriage and its dissolution, and with regards to guardianship of 
children.‛15 Morocco retained a reservation to this Article and to Articles 2, 9(2), 15(4) 
and 29(1).16 Each of these reservations has its base in the Mudawwana and its tenets 
concerning the equality of men and women in marriage, divorce, nationality and 
custody. In short, the pre-2004 Mudawwana created a so-called ‚authentic‛ Moroccan 
family identity that precluded any full engagement in the international (secular) human 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reservations to Article 2 have been withdrawn or modified by any State party<and reservations to 
Article 16 are rarely withdrawn.‛ (CEDAW’s website, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm)  
14 Buskens, 109 
15 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 18 December 
1979, Article 16 
16 Buskens, 109 
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rights community because it upheld the patriarchal nature of the text. Despite its many 
reservations to the document, beginning in the very end of the 20th century, Morocco 
began to undertake comprehensive reforms to try to remedy these reservations. 
In a bid to attract international appreciation of Morocco’s move towards a so-
called ‚modernity‛, Mohammed VI focused on ‚creating an image of openness and 
renewal in political life‛ and claimed his intentions to institute a reform of the 
Mudawwana in accordance with international human rights and Islamic values.17 On 
April 27, 2001 the King established the ‚Consultative Commission Entrusted with the 
Reform of the Mudawwana,‛ consisting of sixteen members, 13 of whom were 'ulama 
and three of whom were female professionals.18 This Commission was entrusted with 
the creation of a new document which adequately reflected the duality of the King’s 
mission and fixed the ‚political shortcomings‛ of Hassan II’s reform.19 However, at the 
same time it was tasked with looking at and incorporating almost 50 years of discussion 
surrounding the Mudawwana.  
With the establishment of the Royal Commission came a renewed debate held in 
both governmental and non-governmental circles. Though the majority of traditionalist 
                                                          
17 Buskens, 94 
18 There were no women who were specialists on Islamic texts or who were part of feminist movements.   
Instead, these women were all highly educated and successful in their respective professional fields. One 
was a sociologist (Rahma Bourqia), a judge (Zhor el-Horr) and a doctor (Nouzha Guessous). The ‘ulama 
were mostly traditionalists, with two reformers who wanted to change the Mudawwana. Please see 
Buskens, 113 for more information.  
19 Zvan, Katja. ‚The Politics of the Reform of the New Family Law (the Moudawana).‛ PhD diss., 
University of Oxford, 2007 and Buskens, 86 
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governmental parties and religious elites (the ‘ulama) rejected reform, non-
governmental organizations (so-called Islamist and feminist groups alike) united in 
calling for a change. Because of the high level of illiteracy among women (60% are 
illiterate) and the linguistic diversity of the country, this discussion took place largely in 
major metropolitan areas, usually limited to Rabat (the capital) and Casablanca (the 
largest city) which are geographically and politically very close and in a constant 
discussion. I will be looking at non-governmental organizations that fall into two 
groups: Islamist and feminist. 
The words ‚Islamist‛ and ‚feminist‛ are both weighted terms in Morocco. In this 
thesis I am choosing to use the word ‚Islamist‛ only when groups specifically define 
themselves as such. The word feminist will incorporate groups who use the word 
‚feminist‛ and ‚feminine,‛ as long as their main concern is the state of women and not 
Islam. Most groups use these words interchangeably, so any references to ‚women’s 
groups‛ refer to feminist groups. The term ‚Islamic feminist‛ is particularly 
problematic, because all members of Moroccan society who identify as feminist would 
reject the descriptive term ‚Islamic.‛ When using the descriptive term ‚Islamic 
feminist‛ I refer specifically to Margot Badran’s definition of an Islamic feminist as one 
who ‚dismantles the alleged opposition between feminism and Islam‛ and ‚unsettle a 
common claim that feminism is Western.‛20 I will also not be using the word ‚secular‛ 
                                                          
20 Badran, Margot. Feminists, Islam, and Nation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
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to describe any group, because each group ‚was born out of nationalism and Islam‛ 
due to their place in Moroccan history.21 By American standards no group would be 
considered secular. As author Sami Zubaida said, ‚many secularist writers have tried to 
exclude Islam and Islamism from definitions of civil society.‛22 My goal is not to do so.  
Many of the recommendations made by Islamist groups were opposed by the 
feminist groups and vice versa, even though all non-governmental groups were alike in 
calling for reform. The discussion held between feminist groups and Islamist groups 
culminated in two competing marches held on Sunday, March 12 2000 in honor of 
International Women’s Day.23  
24After the 2003 bombings of Morocco’s largest city Dar al-Baida (Casablanca), 
the reform became a symbolic necessity for the King.  In May of 2003, five suicide 
bombers attacked three separate areas of Casablanca, killing Moroccans and alerting the 
government to the fact that for the first time, ‚imported‛25 radical Islam was within 
Morocco’s borders. This was the first terrorist attack by Moroccans on Moroccans and 
the King reacted strongly. He used this attack to place Morocco squarely within the 
                                                          
21 Baker, 11 
22 As quoted in Cavatorta, Francesco. ‚Civil Society, Islamism and democratization: the case of Morocco.‛ 
Journal of Modern African Studies 44 (2006): 207. 
23 Buskens, 103 
24 The following page is heavily influenced by a research paper prepared in 2010 for MDES G4253 with 
Professor Hallaq. 
25 In Buskens ‚Recent Debates,‛ he explains that Moroccans consider radical Islam to be a form of Islam 
imported from Saudi Arabia. He explains that ‚their ideas are foreign‛ to Moroccans. Feminists and 




fight between ‚democracy‛ and ‚terror,‛ creating a Moroccan version of the PATRIOT 
Act and signing a Free Trade Agreement with Washington. Part of the King’s project in 
the post-2003 Morocco was to prove his ‚anti-Islamist moderation‛ and to convince the 
west that Morocco was modern.26 Though the Moroccan Islamist groups were not 
responsible for these bombings, the King disenfranchised and suppressed them 
regardless of culpability and moved to quickly reform the Mudawwana.27 The Royal 
Commission heard testimony from members of all feminist groups, but none from 
Islamists. Some scholars, including Zakia Salime, have argued that without the 
Casablanca bombings, the Royal Commission would have remained symbolic and the 
reform process would have taken much longer. 28   
In 2004 the King published the reformed version of the Mudawwana. He ushered 
in this reform with great pomp and circumstance, claiming that the reformed document 
represented a consensus within Moroccan society. In fact, the Commission itself had not 
come to an agreement and had been unable to generate a document. Instead it created 
two lists of suggestions: one list (produced by the traditionalists and ‘ulama) suggested 
no change, and one (produced by the five reformers on the Commission) incorporated 
hearings from non-governmental feminist organizations. The King produced a 
                                                          
26 Salime, ‚The War on Terrorism: Appropriation and Subversion by Moroccan Women.‛ Signs: Journal 
of Women in Culture and Society:2007, 3-12. 
27 For more information see Gray, xvii 
28 Ibid and Petchesky, Rosalind P. 2002. "Phantom Towers: Feminist Reflections on the Battle between 
Global Capitalism and Fundamentalist Terrorism." In Nothing Sacred: Women Respond to Fundamentalism 
and Terror., ed. Betsy Reed, 357-72. New York: Thunders Mouth/Nation. 
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reformed Mudawwana on his own and presented it to the Commission and the 
Moroccan people at the same time. Though the King and his Prime Minister both signed 
the reformed Mudawwana document as the authors, several feminist groups have since 
claimed authorship of this document although it is entirely unclear how much influence 
they had on the final document issued by the King. In addition, the Islamist group al-
‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan has claimed to be the first to call for reform and thus insists on its 
responsibility for the reform effort and product. 
This thesis will examine the discussion surrounding the Mudawwana between 
non-governmental organizations from 1992 to 2004, focusing on two feminist 
organizations (Association Democratique des Femmes du Maroc29 and Union de l’Action 
Feminine30) and one Islamist organization (al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan31). These groups were the 
largest proponents of reform, and all called for different forms the Mudawwana should 
take. In addition to looking at speeches and publicity campaigns, I will focus on these 
organizations’ websites and internet resources. Modern historiography on the 
Mudawwana tends to focus on the political ramifications of the reform itself, but largely 
ignores websites and social networking utilities. Because sites like Facebook function as 
the personal letter of our time, the ways in which actors disseminate information on 
these sites is of paramount importance. These sites are the way in which they are 
                                                          
29 ‚Democratic Organization of Moroccan Women‛ 
30 ‚Union of Feminine/feminist Action‛ 
31‚Justice and Spirituality‛ 
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engaging those not within their immediate surroundings, and promoting what they feel 
is their main message. I argue that each of these three organizations have all claimed to 
be actively and intellectually behind the reformed Mudawwana even while it does not 
adequately reflect any of their demands.  
These facts lend themselves to a series of questions this thesis will investigate. It 
will explore the nature of authorship in the Mudawwana and will examine the claims of 
authorship made by multiple groups. How does the King’s imposition of the 
international human rights frame on this document appropriate, alter or affect the way 
the Mudawwana is used by these groups? For the King, the reformed Mudawwana is the 
culmination of more than 50 years of discussion about women’s rights in Morocco. For 
these groups, the reformed document does not adequately reflect any of their original 
claims and instead appropriates 50 years of their discussion about women’s rights in 
Morocco for the King’s use. Though the document itself does not achieve the changes 
the Commission, feminists, Islamists or even the King claimed it should, paradoxically 
each group has claimed to at least partial authorship in the years following the reform. 
This thesis will question this paradox and determine what might motivate these groups 
to claim authorship of the new Mudawwana. What can the Mudawwana as a live text tell 






‚Moroccan people…[are] imbued with the spirit of the holy war led by Mohammed V, rejecting 
unanimously what the colonizers had tried to impose, and opting …[for] the return of their King 
who embodied all the religious values and ideals of the nation….We will remain faithful 
to the … Bey’a…which draws its substance from the Holy Book [Qur’an] and the tradition of the 
Prophet, and is intimately linked with the Moroccan Constitution which stipulates that the King 
is al-Amir al-Mu’minin [Commander of the Faithful], and is the supreme representative of the 
nation, the symbol  of its unity, the guarantor of the permanence and of the continuity of the 
state…of religion, of patriotism … [and defends] the rights and liberties of citizens whose person 
is sacred and inviolable. ‛32 
-King Mohammed VI 
‚Calling into question the Mudawwana meant calling into question the sacred nature of a 
political system that establishes its legitimacy on a particular reading of Islam…‛33 
 -Nadia Yassine, Islamist and leader of al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan 
                                                          
32 Sincère et loyal, le peuple marocain a été, tout au long de cette période, imbu de l'esprit du combat sacré mené par 
Mohammed V, rejetant unanimement ce que le colonisateur a tenté de lui imposer, et optant avec fermeté pour la 
poursuite de son combat et de ses sacrifices, jusqu'au retour de son Roi qui incarnait toutes les valeurs religieuses et 
les idéaux de la nation. .. Nous demeurerons fidèle à la voie hassanienne, attaché à la Baiea qui nous engage et qui 
t'engage, Baiea qui s'inscrit en droite ligne de celles qui l'ont précédée durant plus de douze siècles, qui puise sa 
substance dans le livre saint et la tradition du prophète, et qui est intimement liée à la constitution marocaine qui 
stipule que le Roi, Amir Al Mouminine, est le représentant suprême de la nation, le symbole de son unité, le garant 
de la pérennité et de la continuité de l'état, de la sauvegarde de la religion, de la patrie et de l'unité du royaume à 
l'intérieur de ses frontières authentiques, celui qui veille au respect de la constitution, qui assure la défense des 
droits et libertés des citoyens et dont la personne est sacrée et inviolable. ‚Discours du 46ème Anniversaire de la 
Révolution du Roi et du Peuple,‛ Mohammed VI. 20 August 1999. 
http://www.map.co.ma/mapfr/discours/revoluti.html  (Translation and bold text added by author). 
33 ‚Nadia Yassine Builds Bridges of Understanding during her Book Tour in the US.‛ Press Release, May 




Modern day Moroccan society is defined in part by its colonial experience, its 
subsequent independence, and its efforts to move toward becoming a modern state. The 
state of contemporary Moroccan history is best described as a constant effort to 
negotiate, balance and merge its history with its colonial past, all the while aiming to 
create a new frame of reference for the modern era. 
King Mohammed VI’s first major speech claimed that as long as women, half of 
Moroccan society, were not afforded their full legal rights, Morocco could not join the 
modern world.34 In addition to providing the legitimacy for his status as Amir al-
Mu’minin (Leader of the Faithful), the Mudawwana also represented the biggest barrier 
to this goal. While Morocco signed CEDAW in 1993, it did so with so many reservations 
that it ‚nullifi*ed+ the convention’s objectives and purposes.‛35 Thus the King’s goal in 
reforming the Mudawwana was not only to provide a new type of (still religious) family 
code for a new (still religious) Morocco, but also to conform to certain conventions that 
met international standards of human rights. 
The Moroccan constitution defines the Kingdom of Morocco36  as a Muslim state 
whose official language is Arabic. Its government consists of a democratic constitutional 
                                                          
34 ‚Discours du 46ème Anniversaire de la Révolution du Roi et du Peuple,‛ Mohammed VI.  
35 Naciri, Rabea. ‚Morocco.‛ In Women’s Rights and the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship and Justice. 
Ed Sameena Nazir and Leigh Tomppert. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanhan, 2005, 187. 
36 Literally ةكلمملا ةيبرغملا. 
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monarchy, where the King serves as Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful).37 
While the state may officially speak Arabic, an approximate 50% of Moroccans are 
illiterate and thus are conversant only in Moroccan dialect (Darija), which although 
connected to Classical Standard Arabic is not intelligible by speakers of Classical 
Standard. Furthermore, an approximate 30% of Moroccans speak different dialects of 
Amazigh, or Berber, and may or may not be conversant in Darija. French functions as 
an unofficial third language, necessary in higher levels of education and in work. The 
relationship between France and Morocco is complicated because part of the first 
independent King’s38 project was to distinguish Morocco as a country culturally, 
politically and religiously distinct from its former colonizers. The Mudawwana has 
historically been the code that both defines the King’s role as Commander of the 
Faithful and separates Moroccan culture from French influence. It is also the code which 
prohibits Morocco from fully ratifying CEDAW.  
Historically, the Sultan of Morocco derived legitimacy from his status as a 
descendent of the Prophet Mohammed through his daughter, Fatima az-Zahra. This 
religiously significant bloodline gave him the blood-related title Sharif and the 
legitimacy to claim the political title of Amir al-Mu’minin or ‚Leader of the Faithful.‛ 
The Sultan’s dynasty is known as the ‘Alaouite Dynasty. Prior to colonialism the Sultan 
ruled by a religious contract called the Bey’a, which symbolized the semi-autonomous 
                                                          
37 Constitution du Maroc, 1996 : Preamble, Articles 1, 6 and 19.  
38 King Mohammed V 
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Moroccan tribes’ acceptance of his religious authority. Morocco is historically a state 
governed by Maliki fiqh, though some Amazigh (also known as Berber) tribes practiced 
their own customary law, but even this so-called customary law derived itself from 
Maliki tradition.39 The acknowledgement of the religious supremacy of the Sultan 
definitively constructed Morocco as a country unified, at least in theory, by its religious 
connection to the Alaouite dynasty. Geographically, Morocco has occupied the same 
territory since the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
The French colonial effort began in 1912 and lasted until 1956. In the 1912 Treaty 
of Fez, Resident General Louis Lyautey guaranteed that Morocco’s religious and 
political institutions could exist side by side with the French protectorate system, and 
he specifically stipulated that the king would retain his religious authority. In an effort 
to remove the religious connection between Arabs and Amazigh, in 1930 the French 
issued the Dahir Berbère, which was a proclamation that stipulated that Berbers would 
go to special Berber/French schools, not be permitted to learn the Arabic of the Qur’an, 
and would be governed by the hazy concept of ‘tribal law,’ instead of Maliki fiqh. 
 Because of the religious importance of Islam (and therefore Arabic) in Morocco, 
the public reacted strongly and negatively to this proclamation. In addition to angering 
the religiously minded among Moroccans, it also partially removed the religious 
significance of the King’s rule for much of the Amazigh population. Not coincidentally, 
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this Dahir also coincided with the beginnings of pan-Arabism, and marks the beginning 
of Moroccan nationalism on a large scale.40 As a reaction, the French changed the 
Sultan’s official title to King, in order to both remove his religious authority and to 
make the country more modern. After pushing through several more policies aimed at 
removing the religious connection between different groups and the King (including his 
brief expulsion from the country from 1953-1955), the Moroccan nationalist movement 
gained ground, leading to the eventual independent in 1956.  
The end of colonization acted as the impetus for discussions about Shari’a across 
the Muslim world. Countries were left with the infrastructure for a modern state, and 
the task of figuring out how to make it both Muslim and modern. Because the modern 
state calls for a centralized government with a legal code, states were forced to create 
new methodologies for the codification of Shari’a. 
Though the Mudawwana is referred to as Shari’a, it is in reality part of historical 
Maliki fiqh. After colonialism, Morocco, like its other majority Muslim counterparts, had 
to decide how to represent itself as both a modern state and as a discrete entity, 
comparable to but not the same as its French colonial counterpart. While Morocco’s 
history did mean that it followed the Maliki School within Shari’a, no version of Shari’a 
had ever been codified. Moroccans drew from and interacted with the postcolonial 
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debate history of Muslim scholars and political thinkers about codification and the 
nature of Shari’a in the modern state.  
In the post-colonial intellectual and political discussion about modern Muslim 
states, words like Shari’a and fiqh are often used interchangeably. Despite efforts on both 
the grassroots and governmental levels towards establishing a definition of Shari’a that 
spans the Muslim world, the very concept of Shari’a varies so widely that even the most 
general discussion must first distinguish between countries, and types of Shari’a.41 The 
standard now is to refer to any fiqh tradition as Shari’a unless the text is directed solely 
at academics. The texts dealing with codification of Shari’a presuppose that the 
translation of either term will be ‚Islamic law‛ regardless, and so they instead focus on 
the political necessity of creating a legally applicable definition. The conflation of fiqh 
and Shari’a is a contradiction within the discussion about codification, because what 
people refer to as Shari’a can refer to either Shari’a as a spiritual message or to fiqh as a 
legal set of guidelines.   
42Some scholars, like Abdullahi An-Na’im, argue that in order to have true Shari’a 
one must have a secular state so that each individual can act according to Shari’a’s 
provisions according to one’s own conscience. True Shari’a dictates that one must make 
a moral decision to follow Shari’a which is removed when the government enforces 
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laws. He claims that the state was ‚never Islamic‛ 43  in the sense that there was no 
formal Islamic code of law on the model of modern western legal codes and argues that 
true ‚Shari’a principles by their nature and function defy any possibility of enforcement 
by the state.‛ 44  His argument is echoed by scholar Rashid Ridda, who opines that 
‚Shari’a cannot be codified as state law.‛45 Prominent legal historian Wael Hallaq 
agrees. He argues that the Shari’a has a ‚moral force‛ which codification would destroy, 
though he disagrees with an-Na’im that there can even be a modern Shari’a.46 The 
traditional Shari’a ‚took for granted< the presence of the moral force‛47 within its 
subjects. This moral subject was part of a community (Ummah) and a larger religious 
system, both of which functioned as the ‚authority‛ behind the law. With codification, 
the ‚moral subject‛ is removed from the system because all members of society are 
subject to the law. Without its community of moral self-regulators, the spirit of Shari’a is 
removed. 48 
Despite the lack of consensus about the nature of Shari’a and its codification 
many countries did indeed codify a form of Shari’a, some in all realms of government 
(post-Islamic Revolution Iran, for example) and some in simply one sphere (like 
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Morocco’s Mudawwana). To do this, each country relied on their own ‘ulama (religious 
scholars trained in analysis of historical fiqh) to determine what was truly Shari’a and 
should be codified.  
In 1957, alongside the creation of the Moroccan Constitution, King Mohammed V 
conversed with his ‘ulama and used his religious status to codify the Mudawwana based 
on historical Maliki fiqh, making it the one religiously inspired legal code in Morocco. 
The religious nature of this code functions as the proof of the King’s continued status as 
Amir al-Mu’minin and thus requires that it remain religiously influenced lest he lose the 
title. Because of its religious significance and connection to the King’s legitimacy as the 
religious leader of Morocco, the Mudawwana was treated as a sacred and immutable 
document by the government from 1957 until the 1990s, thus officially supporting the 
sharp distinction in gender roles and the limitation of women’s freedom to marry or 
divorce of her own free will that were written into the Mudawwana.  
For feminist scholar Amna Arshad, this document in essence ‚froze a woman’s 
role in Moroccan society to a time before imperialism, modernization, and 
development.‛49 The Mudawwana placed women within a ‚patriarchal family model‛ 
and denied ‚all agency‛ to the women citizens.50 Some critics further argued that 
although the King claimed to adhere solely to traditional Maliki fiqh, the custom it 
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draws on in fact is ‚absent from authentic Islamic law.‛51 Beginning in the late 1950s, 
groups of women connected with the nationalist movement began to call for reform on 
their own.  
These calls for the reform of the Mudawwana were not answered by the 
government nor were they supported by any established political group. The liberal 
Nationalist Party’s leader (and ‘alim) ‘Allal al-Fasi was one of the authors of the original 
Mudawwana, and as a result not even this party (which armed women during 
independence) supported calls for reform. Some scholars have argued that after its 
codification ‚there was no public comment on [the Mudawwana]‛ by nationalist women, 
which is not true. 52 What is true, however, is that these comments were unheeded by 
the government until several decades later. 
The late 1980s and 1990s also saw the rise of both political Islam and so-called 
Islamic feminism.53 Most scholars and activists who adhere to the latter decry the 
political Islamist movement, ignoring the fact that their own strategies in many ways 
were spawned by its rise. At first an indigenous Muslim feminism was difficult to 
achieve, since feminism was presented as an imposed colonial project. Political Islamists 
advocated for a ‚return to Shari’a‛ by a rereading of the sacred texts and abandonment 
of traditional fiqh, in hopes that they could evaluate all aspects of private and public life 
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based on the Qur’an and other sacred scriptures.‛ 54 Just as there are several different 
feminist groups and methods, so there are different Islamist groups and methods. 
Islamist movements are usually ‚characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and 
an attempt to implement Islamic values in all aspects of life.‛ 55  Though Islamists 
emphasize a return to the past, they are not traditionalists as the term is understood in 
Morocco.  In Morocco, traditionalists are those who adhere very closely to the 
‚tradition‛ implemented after colonialism which is to say they support the King’s role 
wholeheartedly and deny the need to reform. This group is made up of government 
part members and ‘ulama, largely because calling a manifestation of their religious 
opinions into question also calls into question their monopoly on religious authority. 
Islamic feminists adopted Islamist strategies to support their ideals about Islam 
and feminism.  Scholar Margot Badran coined the title ‚Islamic feminist,‛ defining the 
Islamic feminist as one who ‚dismantles the alleged opposition between feminism and 
Islam‛ and ‚unsettle a common claim that feminism is Western.‛56 These so-called 
Islamic feminists ‚destroy‛ binaries like ‚religious and secular.‛57 Within this group of 
scholars and thinkers, the strategy of returning to the texts is one of many ‚multiple 
critiques‛ 58 which allow Muslim women to ‚reconcile their faith and identify with a 
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struggle for gender equality.‛59 Women in Morocco were active participants in this new 
field of study, which in turn has influenced feminist organizations who try to gain 
popular support for women’s rights by using religiously based arguments. 
According to Badran, Fatima Mernissi is the first ‚Muslim feminist‛ in Morocco 
who began the tradition of looking back at the texts to prove that Islam and feminism 
were compatible. Mernissi’s book ‚The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist 
Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam‛ was originally published in French in 1987 
and translated into English in 1991. This text advocates for a feminist rereading and 
analysis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.60 It was banned in Morocco, though it was still 
highly circulated in academic and activist circles. Because it was published only in 
French and translated only into English, it was available only to those in cities with a 
high level of education (like the participants in the feminist movement to begin with).  
Members of this group include scholar Amna Arshad, Iranian Ziba Mir-Hosseini 
and Azizah al-Hibri, the American Amina Wadud and others. Arshad claims that 
because true Shari’a is separate from fiqh, when codified it must not be ‚static and 
immutable‛ but open to ‚reflect current times.‛ 61 Mir-Hosseini asserts that since Shari’a 
‚is sacred, universal, and eternal‛ while fiqh is ‚human and< subject to change,‛ then 
any fiqh is therefore ‚human and fallible‛ due to its reliance on ‚juristic speculation and 
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extrapolation.‛ 62  Each reform and rereading brings them closer to understanding and 
adhering to Shari’a’s eternal message.   
Azizah al-Hibri argues that ijtihad gives Shari’a a ‚degree of flexibility‛ that 
allows it to be ‚suitable for all times, all people, and all societies,‛ as well as (one would 
assume) all governmental systems.63 These scholars, like Amina Wadud, explain that 
the Qur’an is ‚very much concerned with social justice in the sense that its message is 
intended to right the wrongs of this world,‛ and as such it cannot be interpreted as 
supporting inequality.‛64 
According to Mernissi and the aforementioned Islamic feminist scholars, 
Islamists (not Islamic feminists) stick too strictly to the understanding of Islam as an 
‚absolute and legalistic Islam‛ based on traditional fiqh. These feminist scholars ignore 
the facts that it is generally traditionalists who want to continue to adhere to traditional 
fiqh and that it is Islamists who want comprehensive reform via a return to the texts and 
a renewed adherence to so-called true Shari’a.65 While feminists and Islamists may differ 
politically, the feminist criticism of Islamists in Morocco specifically often rings false or 
semi-true. Along with many other scholars, Islamic feminists conflate Islamists and 
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traditionalists to make a political point or to support negative stereotypes about 
Islamists and the kind of Islam that they support. 
For Islamic feminists, the Islam that has contributed to worldwide reform is their 
own ‚pluralistic and tolerant Islam‛ that makes room for reality and ‚gender 
equality.‛66  This Islam needs to combat the Islam stuck in traditional, patriarchal fiqh. 
Codified fiqh texts like the Moroccan Mudawwana are generally ‚patriarchal in both 
spirit and form,‛ they argue, and they further claim that they are part of a ruse used to 
‚silence and frustrate Muslims’ search for legal justice and equality, which are intrinsic 
to this-worldly justice.‛67 La Ligue Democratique pour les Droits de la Femme68, a close 
friend to ADFM, published a press release in 2000, saying that Islam has, since its 
inception, been ‚a religion of justice and equality.‛ The Mudawwana and its injustice, it 
argued, ‚date*s+ from a period of decadence in Islamic scholarship *and is+ closely 
linked to customary law. Equality is not a foreign idea; indeed, it was put forward by 
Islam long before it became fashionable in the West.‛69 This was echoed by other actors, 
including prominent scholars Abdou Filali-Ansari70 and Mohamed Talbi,71 who agreed 
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that the Mudawwana was an act of interpretation of Maliki sources, but that it longer fit 
the current circumstances and could not be practiced without creating great injustice.  
These scholars and feminist organizations argue that all individuals within Islam 
must have the right to practice ijtihad, or juridical reasoning. ‘Ulama, according to 
Arshad, have been given the flexibility to practice ijtihad but have ‚violated‛ the Islamic 
principle of ‚avoidance of harm.‛ Based on the ‚disproportionately negative effect on 
women‛ that the Mudawwana had, all must return to the ‚beginning‛ in order to ‚avoid 
interpreting laws in a manner that would lead to unjust results.‛ 72 These unjust results, 
for Arshad, are encapsulated in the Mudawwana. Thus the feminist organizations and 
human rights groups painted themselves as the true heirs to both Islam and Moroccan 
history and culture, because ‚true Islam means equality, human rights, and ijtihad.‛73  
According to Fatima Sadiqi and Mona Ennaji, the Moroccan feminist movement 
is focused on ‚demystifying the ‘sacredness’ of Shari’a‛ in order to implement human 
rights on the ground.74 They advocated a re-reading of the classical texts – a ‚flexible‛ 
rereading of the texts.75  In this way, ‚rereading sacred texts and reinterpreting them 
from a feminist point of view. . . open*ed+ new venues to Moroccan feminist scholars‛ 
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in that it is a ‚means of addressing patriarchy.76‛ They stressed that ‚no group 
possesses the exclusive right to interpret the sacred texts<ijtihad is a right possessed by 
every believer.‛77 Instead of stressing secularist reform, these groups like ADFM, UAF 
and others petitioned for ijtihad based on universal values – freedom of speech, human 
rights, civil societies – that are complemented by the Qur’an’s emphasis on equality 
within society. They ‚deni*ed+ the scholars’ claims to the exclusive right to<interpret 
Islam‛78 and called for added participation of women in society.  
In the 1980s the calls for reform intensified alongside the development of 
Islamism and Islamic feminism. Groups focused on increasing rights for women began 
to form as former members of socialist movements began to tire of the lack of support 
from their colleagues. These groups, among which were two of the largest feminist 
organizations, Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF) and Association Democratique des Femmes 
du Maroc (ADFM). These groups were influenced by socialist ideals and the emerging 
field of Islamic feminism in Morocco. These organizations both began to call for reform 
separately, and as their cries for reform increased, so did the effect these cries had on 
the government.  
In 1992 King Mohammed V’s son Hassan II took up the call to reform in order to 
strengthen his own position in the country, not necessarily to gain any kind of 
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international support. His very authoritarian years are known as the ‚Years of Lead,‛ 
and in response to several coup attempts and several suppressed anti-government 
Islamist groups, he reinvented and redefined his title of Amir al-Mu’minin. As Amir al-
Mu’minin he asserted that ‚he alone had the final say in all questions concerning Islam‛ 
and that the ‘ulama must adhere to his wishes. He decided to reform the Mudawwana in 
1992.79 His so-called reform demonstrated a certain level of openness about reform, or at 
least the possibility thereof.  
Rather, it was both retaliatory and extremely limited, functioning principally as a 
vehicle for expanding his own power. At this time, he gave a speech explaining that the 
Mudawwana’s status was of particular significance due to the importance of family in 
Moroccan society. He extended this metaphor into a discussion about how all members 
of Moroccan society were his children and he was the father. As in the Mudawwana, the 
father was in a hierarchical relationship with his family: on top. This placed the King 
squarely in the role of arbiter, mediator, and Amir al-Mu’minin. According to Buskens, 
‚family law‛ helped the king to ‚legitimize his rule in Islamic terms,‛ and so 
secularization was not and will never be an option.80  
Although Hassan II set the ideological stage for reform, he was unable to effect 
change because traditionalists, personified in political groups and the traditionalist 
‘ulama, resisted. He was obliged to convene a group of ‘ulama to comment on his 
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proposed reforms and even his minister of Islamic Affairs, Abdelkebir Alaoui 
M'Daghri, referred to Hassan II’s proposal for reform as being firmly ‚against Islamic 
law.‛ He and the group of ‘ulama decided that ‚only ‘ulama are entitled to interpret 
Islamic law. The decision of the traditionalist ‘ulama overrode the intentions of Hassan 
II, and the reform had to conform to their decision to resist any kind of comprehensive 
reform. As a compromise, Hassan II actually ended up removing some rights for 
women, including the right to retain custody of children after remarrying.  
Though the 1992 reform of the Mudawwana was in fact a stunted, ineffective and 
almost ignored happening, it did have the effect of subtly changing the discussion 
surrounding reform in general. A member of UAF remarked that UAF was ‚not 
dissatisfied‛ in 1992, and argued that reform ‚succeed in breaking the taboo and the 
sacredness‛ of the Mudawwana.81 Likewise, Moroccan feminist scholar/activist Fatima 
Sadiqi agreed that the 1992 non-reform made people realize that the Mudawwana was 
‚just a text‛ and therefore could be reformed again.82 
The renewed debate about the Mudawwana took off with the ascension of 
Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999. During this debate, the King established the 
‚Consultative Commission Entrusted with the Reform of the Mudawwana‛ in 2001. 
                                                          




Three of its sixteen members were female, and the rest were ‘ulama83. The King’s 
instructions were to reform the Mudawwana based on Maliki fiqh, but meanwhile 
exercise ijtihad in order to create a document that both is consistent with the previous 
Mudawwana and protects human rights. His plan considered ‚the tolerant aims of Islam, 
which advocates human dignity, equality and harmonious relations,‛ as well as ‚the 
cohesiveness of the Malikite rite and on ijtihad, thanks to which Islam is a suitable 
religion for all times and places. 
At the same time that women’s rights groups began to increase their call for a 
new reform under the new King Mohammed VI, a new reform faction entered the 
debate: the Islamist movement al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan.84 Though feminist groups in Morocco 
often equated this group with traditionalists as being anti-reform, this group in fact did 
call for reform by returning to a ‚true‛ Shari’a in all aspects of society. This placed the 
Islamists directly in conversation with the feminist groups and directly in competition 
for both societal and governmental support. Their debate culminated in the form of two 
competing protest marches on March 12, 2000. 
ADFM and its allies (including Ligue Democratique) had originally planned to 
hold the Rabat March for Women as part of an International Women’s Day celebration to 
gain international attention for the feminist call for reform. This was supported by 
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scholars and activists throughout the country.85 As a countermove the Islamist groups 
also planned to have a counter-protest in Casablanca on the same day.86 Some have 
questioned why the government gave al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan permission to march since it is 
all but illegal and is not a political party. It may be that though al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan is 
technically banned, the government was not at this time interested in strictly enforcing 
this ban. In Casablanca, the Islamist parties transported supporters in buses from all 
over the country. They were also more organized than those marching in a large mass 
in Rabat – the men were led by the secretary general of al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Farthallah 
Arslan) and the women were led by Nadia Yassine. They all walked in straight lines, 
didn’t speak and carried banners with phrases from the hadith (sayings and actions of 
the Prophet), and statements such as ‚yes to the integration of women in development. 
No to westernization and submission.‛87 
After the march, al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan tried to become a publically active participant 
in the debate about the Mudawwana. It tried to join a public literacy project run by 
Mohammed VI as a sign of good faith, but was prohibited from doing so. It was also not 
allowed to put on holiday camps for citizens. In protest, al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan went to the 
beach and performed prayers in front of beachgoers, trying to prevent people from 
going into the water and sunbathing. This was also prohibited, and the group went 
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back underground. This suppression was in part due to the group’s history of conflict 
with the monarchy and in part to backlash as a result of the 2003 Casablanca 
bombings.88 This attack ‚paved the way for<reform‛ by placing Morocco squarely 
within the war on terror ‚American project‛ in the Middle East.89 Thus, despite all of 
these protests and discussions, the bombings were arguably the deciding factor in 
making the reform imminent and in fact critical. This attack ‚provided the feminists 
with tremendous opportunities for negotiating<as representatives of the forces of 
‘modernity’ and democracy.’‛90 As a result, the feminists were placed as a defense 
against ‚Islamist radicalism‛ against which the most efficient way to fight is through 
the empowerment of women. 
Because Mohammed VI now needed to definitively prove that Morocco was a 
moderate country he decided to reform the Mudawwana immediately. Though the 
Commission failed to come to a consensus and instead presented a list of 
recommendations, he produced a reformed document in 6 months. There is no publicly 
available data saying how the Mudawwana was reformed once the Commission let go of 
it. The document that the government released on February 3, 2004 instead imposed its 
international human rights frame onto the entire Mudawwana discussion. The 
government placed the new Mudawwana in the role of mediator, claiming that it was the 
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result of a coordinated effort of the government and the Moroccan people, agreed to 
without dissent. As a result, the reform presents itself as a legal document and as a 
statement of the government’s presentation of the Moroccan family. But who actually 




















‚The reforms…constitute achievements for all Moroccans, and we took care to ensure 
that they…adopt the tolerant principles of Islam in advocating human dignity…which makes 
Islam valid for any time and place.‛ 
-Preamble to the reformed Mudawwana, 2004 
 
The reformed Mudawwana claims to speak for all Moroccans and to embody the 
wishes of all Morocco’s citizens, men and women alike. Its 132 pages contain one 
preamble and seven specific sections containing provisions about marriage, divorce, 
polygamy and inheritance.91 The King and his Prime Minister signed the preamble, 
making it the definitive statement of his intent in both the reform and endorsement. 
Though he signed it, much of the document is written in a third person narrative which 
blesses the King, so either he is using a royal third person or there is an unnamed 
author who incorporates the King’s opinions into the preamble. 
The preamble presents the Mudawwana without specifying any details, trying to 
preclude a close reading of specific points within the document itself. Though goal of 
the project is ostensibly ‚doing justice to women‛ with adherence to ‚Islam’s tolerant 
ends‛ to the extent that it adheres to the spirit of the modern era, it still must ‚preserve 
men’s dignity.‛ The reform incorporated ‚general principles‛ of both Islam and human 
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rights, based on broad concepts like ‚shared responsibility, equality, equity,‛ and 
‚amicable social relations.‛ Each of these is inherent within Islam as well as a 
‚substantial major component of the democratization process.‛ The preamble notes that 
it has cited ‚the most important‛ reforms for the reader’s convenience.It partially 
reproduces several provisions to show how they adhere to both international human 
rights standards and Islamic standards. The preamble does this without acknowledging 
how little these provisions have actually changed. 92 
The preamble claims the following essential changes of particular import to the 
reader interested in Morocco’s adherence to international human rights law. Point 3 in 
the preamble provides that men and women must now both be eighteen years old to 
marry. This is true: Article 19 specifies that men and women ‚acquire the capacity to 
marry when they are of sound mind and have completed eighteen full Gregorian years 
of age,‛ thus seemingly revising the 1957 Mudawwana’s claim that women could marry 
as young as 15. However, Article 20 responds to Article 19 by stipulating that any 
‚Family Affairs Judge‛ may authorize a marriage under this legal age of marriage ‚after 
having heard the parents of the minor who has not yet reached the age of capacity or 
his/her legal tutor.‛ 
Like Point 3, Point 7 covers the issue of marriage without acknowledging the 
exceptions that undermine Article 19. Point 7 explains that a woman who has come of 
                                                          
92 All following quotations from the Preamble to the Mudawwana. It is not paginated. 
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age has the right to marry ‚of her own free will‛ without a tutor or with a tutor of her 
own choosing. However, at 15 any child may still be married under a tutor based on a 
‚social inquiry.‛ That is to say that if a parent and judge agree a young girl must be 
married to an older man, it is still legally permissible. Article 19 affirms that the age of 
marriage is 18 across the board, while Article 20 provides a mechanism of exception for 
a young girl to be married off by an older family member. 
Point 4 explains that polygamy is now ‚quasi impossible‛ and quotes a Qur’anic 
verse supporting this decision. However, Article 40 clearly stipulates the polygamy is 
forbidden only ‚when there is the risk of inequity between the wives,‛ or if this was a 
stipulation in the wife’s marriage contract. This risk of inequity is determined by the 
judge. 
 Point 6 simply asserts that women now have the right to pursue their own 
divorce, but glosses over the nuance of this provision. In the 1957 Mudawwana the act of 
divorce by repudiation1  (talaq) was defined as a ‚unilateral act of the husband in the 
presence of two just (Muslim) witnesses.‛ In this text Article 44 further stipulated that 
divorce by the woman is not authorized, and that ‚a woman may file for divorce only in 
extremely limited cases and only before a court.‛ Articles 53-58 of the 1957 text 
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stipulated that the only way a woman could gain divorce was mutual repudiation and 
then only as long as the wife paid her husband compensation (khol). 93 
The reformed Mudawwana does not change the paths to divorce but instead gives 
the judges more power to decide when a divorce is valid. Article 84 clarifies that 
unilateral repudiation still a valid path to divorce and gives men most of the power to 
exercise this right. Although a man can always repudiate his wife, the only way a 
woman can repudiate her husband is if he has assigned his right of repudiation to her 
(Article 89). The reformed Mudawwana also preserves the iddat (legal waiting period) 
which requires the wife to remain in the conjugal home until her divorce is finalized. 
During this period, the husband may take the wife back at will.94 Articles 90-93 clearly 
affirm that multiple vows and symbols of repudiation are not legally binding and have 
no weight in court: instead, judges must approve the repudiation.  
Though at times the preamble is written in third person, it opens with a 
statement from King Mohammed VI, claiming ‚I cannot, as Commander of the Faithful, 
permit what God has forbidden and forbid what God has permitted.‛ The opening of 
the preamble describes the reform of the Mudawwana as the culmination of a 
‚civilizational‛ achievement, drawing on the kind of language frame that ADFM, UAF 
                                                          
93 Dalil/Guide to Equality in the Family in the Maghreb. Translated by Chari Voss, edited by Ahmad Kazemi 
Moussavi. Women’s’ Learning Partnership for Rights, Development and Peace, 2005: 92 
94 This is a revocable divorce which can be practiced three times, after which time the divorced woman is 
irrevocably divorced unless she remarries and divorces her new husband. At this point, she may remarry 
her first husband. (Articles 124-127). The main change in this document is that women must now receive 
custody of the children and receive child support in all cases of divorce (Articles 91-92). 
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and their colleagues use. It affirms the King is ‚Chief Commander of the Faithful,‛ who 
has made ‚the promotion of human rights a priority which lies at the very heart of the 
modernist democratic social project of which [He] is a leader.‛95  This brief description 
of the King is accompanied by a glorified description of his ascent to the throne, and his 
project to continue the ‚work of the late King Hassan II.‛ Because the ‚the family 
constitutes the essential nucleus of society,‛ the Mudawwana is necessarily the most 
salient document in this modernist democratic and social project. This focus on the 
family apparently reflects the ‚legitimate expectations of the Moroccan people,‛ and is 
a result of the ‚shared will that unites the entire nation with its leader‛ on the path 
towards ‚civilizational enlightenment.‛ 96 
Mohammed VI’s goal upon becoming King was to place Morocco squarely 
within the international community as a modern state, and the preamble’s words 
showcase the ‚historical transition...this family code represents.‛ In this way the 
preamble presents the new Mudawwana as a legal text that is ‚constitutive of the 
modern democratic society...the perfect combination modernity and tradition.‛97 
Member of the Royal Commission Dr. Nouzha Guessous supports this claim, 
saying that the goal of the Commission was to follow a historical goal in the making 
                                                          
95 يثادحلا يطارقميدلا عمتجملا عورشملا بلص, Preamble to the Mudawwana.  
96 Literally ‚strengthen/reinforce the civilizational radiance/beams of the Kingdom.‛ ‚ يراضحلا عاعشلإا ةيوقت
ةكلمملل.‛ Preamble to the Mudawwana. 
97 All quotations from the Preamble to the Mudawwana. 
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since independence in order to bring society ‚to some changes.‛ 98 Instead of 
acknowledging that in fact the same provisions still limit Morocco from ratifying 
CEDAW, the preamble claims that these provisions have been reformed. Upon delving 
into specific tenets it is clear that though the wording has changed, both the marriage 
and polygamy provisions preclude Morocco’s participation in any international 
women’s rights convention.  
The provisions about age of marriage, divorce and polygamy are the very reason 
Morocco cannot ratify international conventions regarding women’s rights. Because the 
King’s focus on the Mudawwana as a symbol is due in large part to Morocco’s failure to 
fully ratify CEDAW, the King was proud to announce that Morocco would be 
withdrawing its reservations as soon as the reform was complete.  In fact, however, 
Morocco’s reservations have remained the same, prior to and post the reform.  Its 
current reservations are the same as those made when the King first signed CEDAW in 
1993: reservations to Articles 2, 9(2), 15(4), 16 and 29(1).  
Article 2 stipulates that states must ‚adopt appropriate legislative < measures < 
prohibiting all discrimination,‛ in order to ‚establish legal protection for the rights of 
women.‛ 99 Morocco’s reservation to this Article is based on the Mudawwana, within 
which the rights of women ‚differ from the rights conferred on men‛ which must not be 
                                                          
98 Guessous, Nouzha. Interview by author. Casablanca, Morocco, 19 July 2010. 
99 CEDAW, Article 2 
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‚infringed upon,‛ given that the Mudawwana must adhere to ‚the Islamic Shariah‛ and 
must ‚preserve the balance between the spouses and the coherence of family life.‛ 100  
 Article 16 calls for the ‚equality of men and women, in respect of rights and 
responsibilities‛ in terms of marriage and dissolution thereof. Prior to the reform of the 
Mudawwana, Morocco had a particular issue with the ‚equality of men and women, in 
respect of rights and responsibilities‛ in terms of marriage and dissolution thereof, 
because ‚this kind of equality<is<incompatible with the Islamic Shariah<‛ The 
original Mudawwana held that ‚the right of the divorce to the woman is only granted by 
consent of a judge.‛ 101 After the reform of the Mudawwana, this reservation remains. 
Despite this contradiction, the Moroccan government has presented the reformed 
Mudawwana to the people of Morocco and of the world as a document ushering in 
radical change. 
Not only did the King misrepresent the Mudawwana’s changed provisions, but he 
also presented the text to Moroccans and to the world in ways that disguise the 
limitation of the reform. The government sanctioned two official versions of the 
reformed Mudawwana, which are accessible by different sections of the population. The 
King’s website provides both the Arabic and the French versions online, while the 
Arabic version is printed and available within Morocco. But because the literacy rate for 
                                                          
100 Morocco’s reservations to CEDAW, Article 2. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm 




Moroccans is estimated at about 52%, the Arabic version does not necessarily reach the 
Moroccan population. Street sellers put the published document out with other tourist-
oriented books in Classical Standard Arabic in highly frequented tourist areas in Rabat, 
and because the document is expensive (23 Moroccan Dirhams, about $2.75), Western 
students of Arabic and researchers may in fact consult this document more than 
Moroccans. Given the low literacy rate of Moroccans and the fact that many Moroccans 
do not speak Classical Standard, these copies may in fact be for sale as a show and not 
in the expectation that many Moroccans will read them.  
The government sanctioned an official French translation a year after the reform 
of the Mudawwana.102 The French translation, entitled ‚Code de la famille: La 
Moudawana,‛ opens with the same legal title page as the Arabic version. However, 
while the Arabic version begins with the legal title, note by the Prime Minister, and the 
preamble by the King, the French translation has an additional two-page ‚preface‛ for 
the French-speaking reader, written by the Minister of Justice.  
The French preface explains that there is a real need for a translation to reach 
international parties interested in the Mudawwana, though it stresses that it is not just 
‚for‛ French people. It is also careful to explain that this is also a document of import 
for Moroccans living abroad who are interested in the Code. Though it doesn’t 
explicitly say this, it may also be for Moroccans who cannot read Arabic but can read 
                                                          
102 The French version was published in October of 2005. 
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French. There are no statistics revealing how many of these people there are, but they 
do exist, and this may be part of the reason the official French translation exists. 
According to this preface from 2004, there are plans underway to translate the 
Mudawwana into Dutch, Spanish and English because of increased interest in the 
Mudawwana abroad. As of 2010, however, the government has published no more 
official translations, thus limiting the readership to speakers of French and Arabic.  
The preface adopts the frame constructed by NGOs like ADFM and UAF during 
the debate leading up to the reform, specifying that the reform is part of a project 
aiming to adopt a new definition of family for a democratic and modern‛ Morocco, 
stipulating that this depends on equality between men and women. The preface claims 
that Morocco must still retain its ‚identité islamique‛ while reserving its character as an 
innovator. Continuing, it explains that Moroccans perceive the reform as a legislative 
and social revolution that results from Moroccan modernization efforts.103 It stresses 
that the general Moroccan public contributed to this reform but does not acknowledge 
the diversity of opinion among  different groups, nor does it specify which groups 
contributed to the reform.  
According to the French preface there are, ‚multiple meanings that reflect/testify 
to the importance‛ of the Code. These ‚meanings‛ can be found in the Guide Practique 
du Code de la Famille, which is available via the Moroccan government. The 
                                                          
103 « une véritable révolution législative et sociale qui traduit une volonté et une détermination de la 
société marocaine pour la modernisation du pays< », Preface to the French Mudawwana 
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government places a link to this Guide right next to the French version of the 
Mudawwana on the main website for the Department of Justice.  This is a guide to the 
Mudawwana for the French-speaking non-Moroccan. It is in effect a manifestation of the 
state’s effort to present itself to the world as a modern state that successfully melds 
traditional Islamic values with international human rights. Clearly catering to a Western 
audience, The Guide systematically explains excerpts from the Mudawwana and 
explains the meaning for every Islamic term, which most Moroccans would not need. 
As a result, while the Arabic version is the original, the French version of the text 
contains more official information.  
Because the government did not sanction any other translations, a human rights 
organization named HREA (Human Rights Education Associates) published an 
unofficial English version. It is presented as a document which is of import to 
‚researchers *and+ NGOS< interested in family law and the rights of women in 
Morocco. 104‛ The purpose off HREA is to ‚organise specialized human rights training 
via distance< for human rights...and development workers.105 The note attached to this 
unofficial English translation explains that a ‚team of English and Arabic speaking 
lawyers and a professional<translator‛ worked to translate the text literally, avoiding 
all ‚attempts to clarify, explain or interpret the intention of the legislator.‛106 The 
                                                          
104 Human Rights Education Associates, accessed November 2010, www.hrea.org.  
105 Ibid. 
106 English translation of the Mudawwana.  
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English version of the text is accompanied by the full text of CEDAW, clearly showing 
that HREA’s adoption of the international human rights framework. 
HREA’s note to the reader tells the reader to access the Guide to Equality in the 
Family in the Maghreb, which is part of a translation series by Women’s Learning 
Partnership for Rights, Development and Peace (WLP). The WLP is an ‚international 
non-profit<organization that is dedicated to women’s leadership and 
empowerment.107‛ These translations showcase the state of women’s human rights and 
to empower women in ‚the developing<worl*d+.108‛ The translations and articles 
specifically about Morocco were carried out in conjunction with ADFM and present 
Morocco as a country that is unique and forward thinking in its promotion of women’s 
rights. Though ADFM did not officially sponsor this unofficial English translation, 
theirs is among the few websites to list the link. Through subtle actions like these, 
ADFM attempts to paint the reform of the Mudawwana as a struggle for human rights 
and modernity, framed against groups like al-‘Adl w-l’Ihsan who want to bring a dark 
age of religious extremism to Morocco.  
 While both the English and French guides to the Mudawwana reprint only 
excerpts, both reprint the preamble to the original Arabic Mudawwana in full. The 
preamble is consistent in the Arabic, French and English versions and as the most 
reprinted part of the document it takes on an added significance.  
                                                          
107Women’s Learning Partnership, accessed August 2010, www.learningpartnership.org.  
108 Human Rights Education Associates, accessed November 2010, www.hrea.org.  
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While drawing parallels to the original Mudawwana project, the preamble places 
this reform both in contrast and as complementary to the French legal system. It 
references the late Mohammed V, whose work changing the Code of Personal Status to 
the Mudawwana in 1957 ‚constituted the first step in establishing the rule of law and 
unification‛ of Moroccan society. However, this defining document is now being 
replaced by a document that presents itself as modern and draws upon concepts that 
are necessary for Morocco to join the modern international community.   
The preamble glosses over the actual process of reform. The only mention of the 
actors within the reform process is where the preamble references the Royal 
Commission that interviewed Moroccans and incorporated these interviews into their 
reform. Nowhere in the text does the preamble explain the reform process, but instead 
presents the reform as a result of a consensus of the Moroccan people. In fact, however, 
the Commission was unable to come to a conclusion due to the serious ideological 
differences between the ‘ulama and those concerned with feminist issues. The process 
itself took years and incorporated testimony from all aspects of society, most notably 
women’s NGOs like ADFM and UAF.  Islamist groups like al-‘Adl w-l’Ihsan were not 
allowed to give testimony. The only religious perspective given was from the members 
of the board who were traditionalists and did not want reform – the only reformist 
voices officially recorded were those working within the feminist NGO frame. 
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Although the preamble itself concedes that certain aspects of this ‚modernization 
effort‛ have resulted in few changes to specific problematic clauses, the language itself 
is a testament to its adoption of the NGO frame of reference. Though the language does 
support the seeming adherence to international human rights law (like the ‚quasi‛ 
impossibility of polygamy), it is also intentionally vague. The new Mudawwana gives 
judges a wide berth of interpretation and basically allows them to practice family law 
unchanged if they wish.  
The main effect of the preamble on the reformed Mudawwana is to demonstrate 
that the founding philosophy of familial relations has been changed, and that instead of 
a hierarchical relationship the relationship is now one based on equality. Though a 
thorough reading of the entire document complicates this claim, the preamble acts to 
assuage the reader and to demonstrate that rewording makes a difference. Rewording 
older provisions may not change the practical application of laws but it does change the 
way these laws are discussed. By rewording provisions and claiming change, the 
reformed Mudawwana is used by feminist and Islamist groups alike as an example of 








‚Like their liberal opponents, Islamists have adopted the idiom of human rights and civil society 
to defend their right to express their opinions in public.‛ 
-Léon Buskens109 




Although some historians place the Islamist and feminist groups on opposite 
ends of the ideological and functional spectrum, in reality they serve much of the same 
purpose. Historian Katja Zvan admits that ‚the role of women’s organizations in 
Morocco is to a certain extent similar to that of religious (Islamist) groups. They both 
work in the field of improving the social welfare of ordinary Moroccans because the 
state does not provide many of the social services it used to.111 The juxtaposition of these 
two types of engaged participants as ‚antagonistic blocs‛ 112 is a highly simplified frame 
that does not reflect Morocco’s unique history and the nuance and diversity of each so-
called bloc’s positions. While each group does on the surface adhere to an ideology that 
                                                          
109 Buskens, 120 
110 « <Il est indéniable que les islamists ont été influencé par les féminists à propos de la réforme du Code 
de la familly. » Eddouada, Souad and Renata Pepicilli. ‚Maroc: vers un ‘feminism islamique d’Etat.‛ 
Critique International 46 , Janvier-Mars 2010: 99. 
111Zvan, 48. 
112 Ibid., 12. 
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places feminism against Islamism, a closer look at each group reveals both the 
uniqueness of each group’s position and seemingly contradictory similarities. 
According to Moroccan feminist and sociologist Zakia Salime, the 1990s saw the 
beginning of the ‚feminization of the Islamists *and the+ Islamization of the 
feminists.‛113 
 
I. On Feminists 
 
Though the category of ‚feminist NGO‛ is seemingly straightforward, the two 
representative groups of this category promote largely divergent ideologies and argue 
for different types of reform. Former leftist members of the group Partie du Progrès et 
du Socialism (PPS) founded the feminist NGO Association Démocratique des Femmes du 
Maroc (ADFM) in 1985. Its website defines its mission as ‚protection and promotion of 
women’s human rights that are universally recognized.114‛ By ‚defending and 
promoting‛ these rights, it hopes to open Moroccan society to increased democracy.115  
Often ADFM is referred to as a ‚secular‛ feminist organization because it does not use 
the word ‚Islamic‛ to define its mission. Instead, it defines its organization as a ‚non-
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governmental, not for profit, autonomous and feminist organization.116‛ Though ADFM 
does not specifically say that it is a Muslim organization, by virtue of its location within 
Morocco’s history and present, it draws on Muslim conceptions of social and moral 
good, thus justifying my label ‚Islamic feminist.‛117  
The goal of NGO Union de l’Action Feminine was, similarly, to fight for ‚the 
promotion of Moroccan women’s rights.‛ It aimed to ‚promote the situation of women 
in social and legal situations,‛ and to eradicate all forms of discrimination therein 
regarding. To do this, it would fight for literacy for women and access to positions of 
power. Several members of the leftist party Organisation de l’Action Démocratique et 
Populaire (OADP) left this party to join UAF.118 It lays claim to ADFM’s status as the 
first feminist NGO; its website proclaims that it was founded in 1983 as the ‚the first 
Moroccan NGO dedicated to women’s rights.‛119  
These organizations have a history of cleaving to and separating from each other 
as they try to achieve reform. Though the inception of both groups was quite similar, 
after the publication of ‚The Veil and the Male Elite‛ by Moroccan sociologist and 
Islamic feminist Fatima Mernissi, UAF changed its methods. In the 1990s UAF began to 
argue for new readings of the foundational texts, thus adding a self-described ‚Muslim 
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117 Many authors would disagree w this label. Katja Zvan argues that UAF’s Islamic arguments ‚instilled 
some fear‛ into NGOs like ADFM, not mentioning that ADFM also uses new readings of Muslim texts in 
its publications and arguments. (Zvan, 55) 




dimension.‛ UAF is a party for these so-called Muslim feminists in this sense, though 
some historians claim that it does, first and foremost, adhere to the ‚universal values of 
human rights.‛ 120 These values are never specifically defined but this haziness helps 
scholars present UAF as part of the seemingly secular feminist NGO category.  
ADFM and UAF’s historical rivalry is due to their similarity and competition for 
support rather than any inherent difference in opinion. Each seek claim to the title of 
first feminist NGO, and both seek the same constituency of local Moroccan support and 
international financial support. By neglecting to use the word ‚Islam‛ in most of its 
publications, ADFM has historically captured the international human rights groups 
and governments’ support.  At the same time, UAF has separated from the international 
community and instead allied itself with the Moroccan government. UAF and ADFM 
are, in fact, divided in one respect: while ADFM gladly receives international funds, 
UAF declines any outside ‚sphere of influence‛ that comes through funding. UAF’s 
stance against these donations are a response to Islamist calls that financial backing 
from international institutions were tantamount to colonization of opinion.121 
The divide between UAF and ADFM began in the early 1990s at the inception of 
the renewed call for a reform to the Mudawwana. In 1991, members of a non-
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121 Zakia Salime, ‚Between Islam and Feminism: New Political Transformations and Movements in 
Morocco.‛ PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005: 59 
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governmental group called Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité122 in Morocco began to prepare 
for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 1995. 123 At Beijing, 
this group drafted a memorandum that later became the government’s Plan of Action 
for the Integration of Women in Development (Programme National pour l'integration des 
Femmes dans le Developpment), or PANIFD. Its goal was to strengthen ‚women’s status in 
the legal, political and public institutional spheres.‛ 124 It also called for the publication 
of CEDAW in Morocco, as well as the removal of all reservations to the document.125 
The first version of the PANIFD was created within the government by two ADFM 
members, and focused on the reform of the Mudawwana.126 
ADFM took an active role in this conference and so established a friendly rapport 
with international bodies early.  UAF was not invited to join this collective, but instead 
simultaneously established ‚the One Million Signature Campaign;‛ a petitioning 
campaign with the same goal in mind. Both of these movements are considered by the 
respective groups as ‚the beginning< of the struggle< for the reform *of the 
Mudawwana.+‛127  
                                                          
122 This is a transnational women’s rights group that spans the countries of the Maghreb: Tunisia, Algeria 
and Morocco. 
123 Zvan, 50 
124 As reported in Amy Freeman. ‚Re-locating Moroccan Women’s Identities in a Transnational 
World: the ‘woman’s question’ in question. ‚ In Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist 
Geography 11, No 1 (March 2004). p 27. 
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ADFM vehemently denies UAF’s influence in the struggle for reform, pointing to 
its efforts as part of Collectif 95 and Collectif printemps de l’égalité as symbolic of UAF’s 
isolation from the rest of the feminist community. Collectif printemps de l’égalité was a 
feminist collective which consisted of individuals and feminist groups who got together 
in order to support the Royal Commission in reforming the Mudawwana, and to 
influence their decisions with regards to women’s status in the country. On March 19, 
1999, nine months after the establishment of the Royal Commission, Collectif printemps 
de l’egalité presented a proposal for the improvement of women’s position in Moroccan 
society that grew out of the memorandum adopted at Beijing.128  
The efforts of both ADFM and UAF focused on gaining financial and ideological 
support in order to effect real change within the government. Both constantly claim not 
only title to their specific status as feminist NGO, but as the sole influencing 
organization of real political change. Of course the facts point to one truth: both NGOs 
have been active in trying to push for change. But who actually made the change? Both 
lay claim to this as well.    
ADFM’s website asserts that since its inception, the NGO has been committed to 
‚finaliz*ing+ the amendments proposed by the women’s movement on the Mudawwana 
[which] constitutes a major MECHANISM of discrimination against women in 
Morocco.‛ To this end, ADFM put together studies, surveys, mobilizations and memos 
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showing how much influence ADFM had on the outlook of the Moroccan people and 
the government. Its website has an entire section dedicated to the effort spent on 
working towards the Mudawwana reform, detailing every single pamphlet printed, 
amongst other things.129 
One publication it emphasizes as specifically contributing to the reform of the 
Mudawwana is the Dalil pour l’égalité au Maghreb, which is a curriculum guide that was 
published in conjunction with Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité, which is a self-defined ‚Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights network.‛130 This guide, developed in 2003 and 
translated into English in 2005, explains that one must achieve a new level of women’s 
rights in the Maghreb (the region including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and explains 
the egalitarian vision this network has for the region. It is the product of a combined 
effort of several different lawyers and members of NGOs that span the Maghreb region. 
Developed just before the full reform of the Mudawwana, this piece was used to 
influence ‚concerned government departments, parliamentarians, the King’s advisors, 
members of the commission for reform, and others.‛131 
The Dalil serves as a guide ‚primarily intended for activists and human rights 
advocates‛ and strives to develop arguments that can influence not only the local 
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governments in the region but also human rights workers across the world. According 
to its introduction, tension in the society  represents ‚ambivalence in the debate on 
universal rights and cultural *religious+ specificities.‛132 It opens with a question it 
dedicates half its pages to disproving: ‚Is family law in the Maghreb a sacred law, 
doomed to remain unchanged?133‛  
After explaining that ‚the idea of an immutable and sacred Islamic law is the 
fruit of a doctrinal development, and a dominant version of history,134‛ the document 
goes on to explain that CEDAW is an effective meter of women’s rights, explaining its 
status as a ‚vital instrument.‛ CEDAW is ‚comprehensive‛ and should be applied in 
full when States ratify it. Collective 95 Maghreb Egalité is ‚pushing for the universal 
values recognized‛ therein, claiming that the invocation of Islam as the State religion is 
‚artificial,‛ and that ‚human rights are indivisible by virtue of their universality.‛135  
The Dalil relies on religious arguments to support the idea that human rights are 
universal. The Guide is a criticism of the family law codes in all the Maghrebi countries 
including the pre-2004 Moroccan Mudawwana. It brings up articles that preclude 
Morocco’s 100% ratification of CEDAW that relate to polygamy, underage marriage, 
divorce and inheritance. Each point has a section dedicated to sociological argument 
and universal human rights arguments which are then placed together under the 
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heading ‚doctrinal arguments‛ which draw on Islam to prove their point. For example, 
after decrying the Mudawwana’s statements that repudiation (talaq) is ‚is a unilateral act 
of the husband‛ and is ‚not authorized by the courts< a woman may file for divorce 
only in extremely limited cases and only before a court,136‛ the text counters with quotes 
from the Qur’an in an attempt to prove that ‚the Qur’an has never limited a women’s 
ability to seek a divorce.‛137  
Because this document was both prepared and translated by lawyers under the 
supervision of jurists, its legal arguments have many dimensions and also use creative 
strategies to prove its points. The Dalil mentions that the Moroccan Mudawwana defines 
marriageable age as 18 for men but 15 for women. However, it argues that in addition 
to this violating international human rights standards, it is also violating Maliki fiqh 
which demands that one must be 18 years of age prior to entering in a marriage.138  
Although there is no clear quote within the Qur’an that supports this (the text only 
stipulates puberty as a requirement), the Dalil asserts that all have the right to return to 
the text and reinterpret statements because Islam is a feminist religion. A rereading of 
the Qur’an connects both the universal definition of minimum marriage age to the 
Islamic tenet of fairness. Because of this, all 111 pages of the Dalil rely on the Islamic 
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feminist strategy of returning to the text to prove its points.139 As a result, the Dalil 
contributes to a takedown of historical Maliki fiqh as invalid, while relying on new 
religious methodology. While upholding universal human rights as the ultimate goal it 
uses Qur’anic verses to prove that universal human rights are valid.  
Though ADFM is a Moroccan organization, the acknowledgements for the Dalil 
explain that this effort would not have been possible without help from many 
organizations that helped to fund the book, including the European Union. ADFM also 
lists its partners on the website, none of which is Moroccan. Its partner list, found 
here140 includes UNIFEM, UNICEF, WLP, UNESCO, the EU, several French NGOs and 
a few Spanish ones. Because ADFM courts funding from international organizations 
who are interested in achieving change in local communities, the group takes great 
efforts to present its effort as a local one to the casual (western) reader. None of this 
information about partners is available in Arabic, and in the Arabic version instead the 
website lists a series of religious books which do not exist in French.  
 It is difficult to separate ADFM’s opinions prior to and after the reform because it 
revamped its materials in 2008 and presents different opinions in different languages. 
Its Arabic website is questionably spare, consisting mostly of scanned photographs with 
little descriptions. There are no articles. This may be due to the difficult of typing 
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Arabic, or because ADFM relies mostly on international support whose members do not 
speak Arabic. The French website focuses on convincing readers of the importance of 
ADFM’s actions in accomplishing the reform of the Mudawwana without specifying 
which provisions it actually contributed to changing. While ADFM contributed in large 
part to the previously mentioned Dalil which criticizes the King and the Royal 
Commission’s reform efforts, in recently written articles it claims that it has always 
supported both the King and the Royal Commission. Every article on the Mudawwana 
praise the government’s efforts and claim that ADFM was the main influencing factor in 
these efforts.  
ADFM not only lays claim to influencing the reform of the Mudawwana but also 
recreates each step of its actions in reforming the code. Because each provision they take 
issue with in the Dalil remains the same, they do not mention their previous qualms 
with the 1957 Mudawwana and in fact do not place the Dalil among their publications. 
Instead, the website describes the March of March 12 200 as the ‚culmination‛ of the 
first stage of their ‚mobilization.‛ This march in Rabat, which was a product of the 
‚Printemps de l’égalité‛ movement, was the perfect manifestation of ADFM’s 




ADFM also undertook other efforts, all of which focused on gathering critical 
masses of women together. As part of a protest, ADFM walked with women in May 1, 
brandishing cooking utensils ‚as a tribute to all those working at home and whose work 
is not recognized.‛ ADFM also organized a sit-in in front of Parliament on March 8, 
2002 in order to coordinate the distribution of leaflets on July 7 of the same year, 
including multiple other sit-ins. These are pictured here with minimal captions which 
claim that each small effort is part of a larger mobilization effort in Morocco. 
142 
ADFM’s most comprehensive article on the Mudawwana (and the only article 
appearing in all three languages) is entitled ‚Moudawana,‛ and details every single 
                                                          





way in which ADFM was the main force in reform efforts. This article glosses over the 
fact that the reformed document does not correspond with their previous plans, 
including the PANIFD. Because this article was written after the Mudawwana reform, it 
connects pre-2004 efforts with a 2005 effort to create an information campaign to inform 
women about the new Mudawwana. In an effort to inform the population, ADFM clearly 
lays out each action it has taken. However, though the article is available in each 
language, this document itself is available only to the French-speaking reader. This 
document, named ‚les outils de la campagne,‛ explains that ADFM has taken specific 
efforts to appeal to non-French speakers, among which are: 4 television spots on the 
national channel in both Arabic and French, 6 radio spots in Arabic, 6 press releases in 
Arabic and French and a variety of surveys with no clear indication of who it surveyed 
or what kinds of places/languages it surveyed in. ADFM describes certain ad campaigns 
that did not run, but which are proposed to educate the population about the new 
Mudawwana.     
143 
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This picture above refers to the new Article 25 of the Mudawwana which declares 
that a woman is able to conclude her own marriage. However, it ignores the fact that a 
judge may override this with a parent or guardian’s consent. Likewise, its other 
pictures, although they make correct statements about the new Mudawwana itself, 
ignore the exceptions to the rule. Only available in French, like the Preamble to the 
Mudawwana, the explanation of campaigns glosses over the increased leeway judges 
have to decide whether or not to impose changes. ADFM uses these documents as proof 
of its role as ‚a force of proposal and advocacy144‛ for women’s rights in Morocco.  
While ADFM relies on its participation in organizations like Maghreb 95 and 
international collectives, UAF defers to the Moroccan government. In fact, though there 
is a UAF website, its current information is updated on tanmia.ma, which is the 
government’s development project website. It is not friendly to the Western press, and 
the online information about UAF is available only via the government.  
UAF’s website is very spare, preferring instead to link to tanmia.ma’s campaigns. 
Its website documents various sessions held by the government, like an awareness 
session held on the 12th of January, 2009.145  This session was held to ‚discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of different types of divorce in the Mudawwana,‛ and 
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was held to engage with ‚university professors, students, doctors, social workers, 
journalists and women’s associations.‛   
146 
Unlike ADFM’s photos of radical action, UAF presents photos of calm meetings 
and decisive legislative action, representing itself as an active participant in government 
action rather than as an organization that is out in the streets holding and organizing 
protests. It is interesting to note that UAF’s website does not mention their co-
sponsorship of the Rabat March in 2000.  
UAF is careful to show its national partners in order to emphasize that it is not 
like ADFM with its large body of international supporters. Though UAF does have 
support from a host of international endowments and smaller European NGOs, the UN 
does not endorse UAF, nor do any other universal human rights organizations or EU 
organizations. Its national partners include the Ministries of Justice, National Education, 
Social Development and family. It is also supported by a host of Islamic organizations, 
and Arabic women leagues. 
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Instead of focusing on its protest actions, UAF instead emphasizes its 
instrumental role in establishing Tanmia, which is an internet project for organizations 
to make social change. By using the internet as a resource, these organizations can effect 
change more quickly and effectively. 147 The financial partners of Tanmia are all western 
organizations, including the economic section of the American Embassy and an English 
program named Development Gateway. UAF supports the program because it is still 
under the auspices of the Moroccan government.  
A main part of Tanmia’s website is the campaign known as Connais tes Droits148, 
which is geared towards reaching Moroccan women and telling them about the new 
Mudawwana. This section presents a series of videos entitled ‚Divorce, Marriage and 
Custody‛ respectively. Each of these videos is in French, Arabic and Amazight, and 
each has two parts. The first video represents an artificial family situation and instructs 
Moroccan woman about their rights. In each movie a French advisor appears and 
explains that with the new Mudawwana everything is changed. The second part of the 
videos is called ‚speakerine‛ because a speaker comes on and explains exactly why this 
is true. However, if the person accessing these videos wants specific information this 
person must speak French because almost all written information in this section is only 
available in this language. In addition, only a projected 33% of the population has 
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access to the internet and 60% of women are illiterate.149 Though this project is geared 
towards accessing all members of Moroccan society, the only people accessing the 
videos will be those who speak French and have access to the internet, not the women 
in the countryside who are pictured in the videos.150  
Not ADFM, UAF nor even the government has undertaken cohesive projects that 
actually reach the population at large. The government has shown one movie that has 
probably reached the general population. The government’s film/radio station 2M 
reaches 80% of the population with its multiple language broadcasts, and shows movies 
each night which are seen by a majority of Moroccans. This station broadcast 2009 Zakia 
Tahiri film ‚Number One‛ when it came out as an effort to reach Moroccans about the 
Mudawwana, though the view it gave of the reform was not serious or necessarily for 
Moroccan viewers.  
First and foremost, « Number One » is not a translation of the Arabic, but instead 
the name in Arabic is simply a transliteration of this, which speaks to its clear targeted 
audience (namely, English-speakers). The synopsis of the film describes Aziz, who runs 
a clothing factory and terrorizes his wife and daughter. One day his wife sees that he 
can be gentlemanly while he is trying to impress a foreign client, so she casts a spell ‚so 
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that this moment of happiness will never end‛ and ‚Aziz becomes a feminist despite 
himself< his life becomes a hell.‛151 
This film, which was funded by the fashion magazine Femmes du Maroc, presents 
the new Mudawwana as a bouleversement (total upheaval) of the hierarchies in the family 
where the father is ‚number one.‛ However, this is really represented as an entertaining 
concept, which the new Mudawwana does not change. This film in effect is a humorous 
take on the reform which merges the claims of the feminists with the claims of the 
Islamists: while the Mudawwana adheres to certain provisions of rights these rights are 
imposed and are fundamentally unnatural to Moroccan society. The attached poll 
undertaken by ADFM supports this, with almost 50% of those polled say the 
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While ADFM and UAF both belong to the same general feminist category, the 
Islamist groups occupy a different category also interested in reform. There are two 
large Islamist groups in Morocco: al-Tawhid wa-l-Islah, or Unity and Reform and al-Adl 
wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality). While al-Tawhid wa-l-Islah is a government party, al-
Adl wa-l-Ihsan operates underground and is scorned by the government who called it a 
group of ‚Islamic dissidents.‛153 Because of the controversial nature of al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan 
it is difficult to gauge its influence in the process of the Mudawwana reform. However, 
it is credited with convincing the government to drop Printemps de l’égalité’s suggestions 
and to change PANIFD completely. 
Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan was established in 1978 by Sheikh Abdessalem Yassine, a 
religious and politically minded teacher. He gained recognition in Morocco prior to the 
establishment of this group with his 1974 pamphlet entitled ‚Islam or Deluge.‛ He sent 
this pamphlet to Hassan II calling for him to renounce the title of Amir al-Mu’min and to 
admit that Morocco was no longer an independent Muslim country but instead a 
secular, Western-influenced country. His reward was imprisonment, followed by house 
arrest. His organization continues the call for a return to a true Islamic state and is 
generally considered to be the ‚largest movement of opposition to the monarchy,‛ or at 
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least to its role as head of religion.154 Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan is the Islamist organization with 
the most active women’s component, which developed in the late 80s ‚in parallel to the 
rise of feminist groups.‛155 Most Moroccan women who identify as Islamists or who 
subscribe to Islamist positions are part of the movement started by al-‘Adl w-l-Ihsan. 156 
Because Sheikh Yassine is now in his seventies, his daughter Nadia has become one of 
the most vocal members,  promoting the group’s causes and founding  the women’s 
branch of the organization 
Nadia Yassine is arguably one of the most publicized Islamic figures both in 
Morocco and around the world. While her father is a part of the Sufi brotherhood (a 
collective of Muslim mystics) she self-identifies as a ‚militant Neo-Sufi.‛157 Though she 
has spent much of her tenure in this position in exile and under threat of prosecution, 
most scholars agree that although she is not the president of Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan,  the 
organization ‚evolve*ed+‛ around Nadia Yassine. Yassine’s is not only the group’s 
spokeswoman but also proof that the Islamist movement is not anti-feminist. She has 
been much quoted railing against the ‚ready-made cliché‛ which is perpetrated by the 
international press: ‚the reactionaries, the women’s backward enemies have 
demonstrated in Casablanca. The democrats, the woman’s progressive friends have 
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marched in Rabat.‛158 She explains that although Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan marched alongside 
those who did not want reform, it was because it did not agree with the method of 
reform feminist groups were advocating. She agrees with feminist groups that the 
‚Mudawwana gave power to men in the name of religion.‛ She goes further, however, 
saying that the nature of the King’s rule is unavoidably ‚patriarchal‛ and in fact the 
Maliki fiqh behind the Mudawwana is a return to the ‚heathen patriarchal system upon 
which the Prophet< declared war.‛ This ‚particular reading of Islam‛ is false, and 
therefore is not religious at all. 
Yassine argues that in fact, groups in ADFM and UAF were too afraid to call the 
Mudawwana into question until she herself did so. She claims that in the 1990s she was 
the first to actually ‚break the taboo‛ and publically communicate that ‚the Mudawwana 
was not a sacred text.‛ The feminists were afraid to do so because calling it into 
question would ‚mean calling into question the sacred nature of a political system that 
establishes its legitimacy on a particular reading of Islam.‛ While she agrees with 
feminist groups about reform and in fact apparently supported their march,159 any 
reform within which the King has a role is ‚aberrant.‛160 In a series of articles, speeches 
and interviews given in French magazines she argues that though the feminist 
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movement ‚pretends to be democratic and modernist,‛ the members of this movement 
participate in a government which is non-democratic. 161  
For Yassine, the entire reform process touted in different ways by ADFM and 
UAF is part of ‚the framework of a desire by the North to dominate the South through 
setting up a standard model for the world in order to facilitate a better cultural 
domination of nations.‛ 162 Members of ADFM generally do not acknowledge al-Adl wa-
l-Ihsan’s charges against their organization, but UAF’s president Latifa Jbabdi, 
responded saying that Yassine’s ‚pro-reform stance is ‚pure demagogy<What she says 
is one thing. What she does is another.‛ Though UAF is negative towards Yassine’s 
words it is aware of their power: it refuses to take international donations partially to 
counter this specific criticism. While Yassine’s criticisms influence UAF’s actions, 
Yassine’s actions support Jbabdi’s criticisms.  
Though Yassine decries both the government and the westernization of the 
reformed Mudawwana, she spends much of her time promoting books in the west trying 
to gain support from western scholars. In addition to spending much of her exile in 
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France, she has gone on several American university tours to spread al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan’s 
message. Transcripts of her tours are posted immediately on her website, fully 
interactive and available in French, Spanish, English and Arabic. Instead of referring to 
al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan as an Islamist group, she constantly argues that it is in essence ‚one 
hundred percent political‛ and the members are fighting for their natural human 
rights.163 In a RFI (Radio France Internationale) interview, she claimed that the march in 
Casablanca was a march for cultural ‚self-determination.‛ Instead of marching against 
reform or against feminism, members of al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan instead were marching to 
‚end their marginalization from the political field.‛164 She uses words like ‚liberty‛ and 
‚freedom‛ only when targeting a western audience, favoring the use of Qur’anic verses 
or references to the Prophet  when speaking in Arabic or French in Morocco.  
Though al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan is a strictly Moroccan group focused on resolving issues 
in Morocco, Yassine has shifted a huge part of its focus onto on disseminating 
information to the non-Arabic speaking reader. Sheikh Yassine published all of his 
books in Arabic but Nadia Yassine publishes her books in French and English. Al-Adl 
wa-l-Ihsan now has an English book publishing company named ‚Justice and 
Spirituality Publishing‛ which puts out translations of books, namely written by Nadia 
Yassine. Though Yassine does not speak English and is ostensibly against any and all 
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linguistic colonization by the French, her various book tours celebrate the 
communication with the west. 
 During one such tour for her book ‚Full Sails Ahead‛ in 2006, Justice and 
Spirituality Publishing released a press release entitled ‚Nadia Yassine Builds Bridges 
of Understanding During her Book Tour in the US.‛ This press release is accompanied 
by a photo of Yassine sitting happily, surrounded by western faculty and happy to be 
building ‚bridges of understanding with the people of the West.‛165 
166 
When Yassine publishes books abroad she presents herself as an emissary of 
cultural understanding, trying to correct misperceptions about Islamist groups and 
their goals.167 Her various websites and social networking sites also picture her carrying 
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English slogans referring to certain rights considered inalienable. For example, on her 
English facebook page all of her pictures have her marching nonviolently, surrounded 
by men and wearing an English slogan. These pictures draw a parallel between her 
non-violent protest for freedom of press and opinion and America’s provision for 
freedom of press. However, Morocco does not and has never had this provision, 
making the charge less valid if one knows Morocco’s constitution. No picture of the 
kind can be found on her French or Arabic sites, suggesting that this kind of depiction is 
intentionally focused on gaining support or empathy from Americans or other English-
speakers.   
168 
 
In her Arabic and French publications, Yassine presents her social activism as a direct 
counter to that of ADFM and UAF. While ADFM’s presents the Rabat rallies through 
pictures of large groups of women and men all yelling, Yassine always presents 
pictures of organized groups of women in straight lines and never surrounded by men. 
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Yassine portrays herself as both militantly anti-establishment and pro-Islamic: both 
respectably hijabi169 and radically politically active. She is always pictured in active 
poses but she never has an open mouth, and she is always pictured with women 
wearing traditional Moroccan clothing.  
By joining her struggle with narratives from western countries, Yassine portrays 
herself as an activist interested in enacting social change and limited by the ban on her 
non-governmental organization. Some scholars argue that this is because al-Adl wa-l-
Ihsan is trying to reinvent itself as a force for ‚secular civil-society activism.‛170 Other 
scholars like Léon Buskens disagree, and argue that al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan uses its influence 
in order to stall activism.  
Yassine fights these accusations by explaining that al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan does block 
reforms lacking in religious legitimacy but is in favor of a different form of reform.  
Statistically, al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan has a larger base of support than do ADFM and UAF. 
While the march in Rabat was large (approximately 40,000-100,000) the Casablanca 
march was larger still (100,000-200,000).171 Léon Buskens argues that Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan’s 
participation in this march was the reason the Islamist side was so large and effective.172 
In fact al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan’s participation in the march ‚pushed the government to 
withdraw its National Plan for the Integration of Women in Development (PANIFD) 
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that proposed major changes to the Mudawwana.‛173 This march showed al-Adl wa-l-
Ihsan’s strength and ‚reversed the gains made by feminist groups‛ by showing that it 
had more local support.174 This moved the reform to ‚less contested grounds‛ and may 
be the reason why the King was unable to fully change the document itself. The group 
would prefer a different kind of reform which fully incorporates a back-to-the-text 
reading of the foundational documents. This is the reason by Yassine came out against 
the reform in 2004.  
By 2006 Yassine changed her methods and instead claimed authorship of the 
Mudawwana. In 2004 she argued that the Mudawwana was a religiously invalid 
document, existing only to support the rule of the king and reformed in ‚the image of 
the ruling autocracy.‛  During her book tour in 2006 she shifted her critique, explaining 
that the reform was in fact ‚good and important, without a doubt.‛ While on the same 
book tour, she softened her rhetoric and began to call for a new reform because the new 
Mudawwana ‚does not match up with Moroccan reality.‛175 This softening of rhetoric 
came at a time when her exile was lifted and she was no longer under the threat of 
prosecution, and may in fact be a bid for increased participation with other 
organizations.  
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ADFM and UAF have agreed with al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan that the reform of the 
Mudawwana is not the last reform that must take place. One highly censored and 
controversial magazine, TelQuel (the Arabic version Nichane is often banned for brief 
periods of time) published a criticism of the new Mudawwana with quotes from ADFM 
members and Moroccans who did not know what the new Mudawwana was.176 One 
ADFM member explained that the government did not provide information to citizens 
in the correct languages, and al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan agreed. While they all claim authorship of 
the reform, they also criticize the reform’s actual impact. 
As of 2011, all three groups claim that they are responsible for the reform of the 
Mudawwana, and that any and all defects in this reform are due to the government. 
While al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan did in fact cause the government to abandon the ADFM pushed 
PANIFD, it never once acknowledges the increased role feminists had in influencing the 
government after the Casablanca bombings or the fact that it was excluded from 
interaction with the Royal Commission. ADFM and UAF ignore the role the other had 
in calling for a reform and deny that al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan ever wanted reform. These groups 
reject Yassine’s arguments about a different kind of reform, instead treating her speech 
as hyperbole. Each group uses the method of returning to Islamic texts, though al-Adl 
wa-l-Ihsan uses this rereading to prove that the King’s religious legitimacy is invalid 
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while ADFM and UAF use this rereading to prove that human rights and Islam are 
compatible.  
It is impossible to gauge who had more of an influence in the reform of the 
Mudawwana, and whose suggestions were taken into account in 2004. These three 
organizations span the categorization of ‚feminist‛ and Islamist‛ which are usually 
placed at opposing ends of the spectrum. Each entered into the discussion about the 
reform of the Mudawwana calling for change but disagreeing about how to accomplish 
this change. Though the finished Mudawwana doesn’t reflect specific claims from any 















‚[The 2004 Mudawwana is a text] that both Islamists and feminists could claim as a 
victory for their respective positions.‛  
 -Janine A. Clark and Amy E. Young, ‚Islamism and Family Law Reform in 
Morocco and Jordan‛ 345 
 
The Mudawwana is a deceptively simple text. It is a document touted by the King 
as the manifestation of a unified effort of the Moroccan people to reform women’s 
rights. It is hailed by scholars as one of the ‚most advanced codes for families‛ in the 
MENA region.177 Its status has been a topic of debate from inception, sparking 
conversations about reform from 1957 on. King Mohammed VI shifted the frame of the 
conversation to the interplay of international human rights and Islam when he rose to 
power. While the political nature of this document clearly called for engagement by the 
government, non-governmental organizations also contributed to  
the reform. 
Although these non-governmental organizations fall into two categories that are 
seemingly opposed (feminist and Islamist), through a reading of their documents and 
presentation of arguments for reform, the reader sees the similarities between the 
                                                          
177 Salime, ‚Between Islam and Feminism,‛ 11 and CNN 2009.   
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projects. Each group spoke, and each group advocated for a variation on a rereading of 
Islamic texts and a combination with international human rights.  
If the Mudawwana reflects the discussions of thousands of people, multiple 
groups and lots of social activism, then who is the author? Is it King Mohammed VI, 
who absorbed all of the information and made the definitive choice about wording and 
provision? Is it ADFM, who spent their internationally funded money trying to make 
change within the government? It could be UAF, who worked with the government to 
get local support, or even al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan whose notoriety has increased its popularity 
with the Moroccan people. Each of these groups has claimed authorship of this 
document while simultaneously criticizing the others groups that claim authorship.   
Most writers credit one actor in the Mudawwana reform without considering the 
other influences and groups that participated in the reform. Many ignore the Islamist 
contribution altogether, referring to their beliefs as ‚ideological straitjackets‛178 and 
explaining that the Casablanca bombings removed any influence the Islamists might 
have had. This same argument is used to support why the feminist groups had the most 
influence in reform, though the provisions they were trying to change (polygamy, 
underage marriage) did not succeed. That being said, the opacity of the text allows 
judges to interpret change into the text at will and effectively either disallow or uphold 
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Mediterranean Politics 13, no. 3 (2008): 349 
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provisions like polygamy. Because of this flexibility, any group can claim change 
provided the judge agrees with its point of view. 
ADFM, UAF and al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan all claim authorship to the reformed 
Mudawwana in order to preserve their social capital. That is to say that these groups 
have been at the forefront of discussions and pushes for the reform of the Mudawwana 
for 50 years. The King appropriated the discussion and used the reform as a tool to 
change Morocco’s international image. Rather than be shut out, all three groups tried to 
join in the process. Though al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan was shut out of the Commission’s 
hearings, the Commission’s list of provisions may not have incorporated the testimony 
of ADFM and UAF. In order to prove that their organizations are making a difference, 
these groups have claimed responsibility for and influence in the reform making 
process. Accordingly, ADFM refers to the Mudawwana as the ‚culmination‛ of the first 
stage of their ‚mobilization.‛179  If the Mudawwana does not adhere to their original 
demands, they will adjust those demands to claim social capital and power as activists.   
New scholarship continues to emerge that focuses on the reform as an interesting 
example of grassroots effort that culminates in political action, stating that the process 
itself is admirable and that the results may take time.180  
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180 Zoglin, Katie. ‚Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women.‛ Human Rights Quarterly 31 
(2009): 984, interview with Nouzha Guessous. 
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If each group can equally claim authorship of the reformed document then the 
actual purpose and accomplishment of the reform is up for debate. The King ostensibly 
supported reform in order to remove reservations to CEDAW and to bring Morocco 
into the international community. But not one reservation to an international 
convention has been lifted.181 Nevertheless, international bodies believe that the reform 
‚constitutes a landmark in the history of Moroccan women’s struggle for equality,‛ and 
claim that it ‚represents a successful test for Morocco’s progress in the field of human 
rights.‛182 Although ADFM, UAF and al-‘Adl w-l-Ihsan each claim authorship of the 
reform, each also calls for a more comprehensive reform that makes more decisive 
change.  
The Mudawwana, like many legal texts, leaves us with a paradox. It is impossible 
to determine an author because the ideas discussed and reformed have been present in 
Moroccan society since its independence and the first codified Mudawwana. The 
Mudawwana is a nationalist document, a royalist document, a feminist document and 
an Islamic document. The reformed document may be more about appearance than 
change, and serves to underscore the importance of the discussion about women, family 
and Islam within 21st century Morocco. Whether or not the reform succeeded or will 
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succeed in effecting change is for the future to determine. The Mudawwana will have the 
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